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Since World War II the United States and Mexico have established 
friendly relations based on mutual economic interests, but marred 
by old resentments and long-standing problems. The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the current state of relations between the 
United States and Mexico. The scope of the thesis covers the years 
1976 to the present, a period in which oil surfaced as a signifi-^ 
cant factor in U. S. - Mexican affairs. The study focuses on the 
role of economics in cementing a stormy friendship, specifically 
looking at the issues of trade, oil, and immigration.
The century following Mexico's independence was a period of 
hostility in which the United States dominated Mexico. Mexico 
lost the territories of Texas, California, and New Mexico to the 
United States through annexation and war, and suffered loss of 
economic sovereignty to U. S. business interests. The resentment 
caused by these events continues to influence relations.
Common economic interests have pulled the United States and 
Mexico into a more friendly relationship, with the United States, 
however, continuing to dominate. Mexico is a valuable trading 
partner for the United States, but accounts for only a small 
percentage of U.S. imports and exports while the United States 
accounts for over half of Mexico's import-export trade. Immigra­
tion provides a similar situation with the U.S. relying on Mexico 
for inexpensive labor, but not to the extent that Mexico counts on 
immigration as a safety valve for its unemployment problem. Oil is 
the one area in which the two economies are more truly interdepend­
ent: Mexico sells the preponderance of its oil to the U. S. while
U. S. banks hold the preponderance of Mexico's oil debt.
Economics binds the United States to Mexico, but the continual 
contact involved creates day-to-day problems such as differences 
over restrictions on tomato exports. Such details can be worked 
out relatively quickly, but there are more basic differences. The 
U. S. promotes free trade while Mexico practices protection of its 
industry. In immigration the U. S. attempts to enforce ceilings, 
but Mexico allows unrestricted emigration.
The resulting controversies create an image of tension obscuring 
the fact that the U. S. and Mexico continue to work together peace­
fully. Relations continue to be basically cordial because it is to 
both country's economic advantage to remain friendly.
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United States ties with Mexico are strong. To quote Henry Kissinger, 
"The imperatives of the relationship of Mexico and the United States are 
not to be found in words, but in geography. Our shared destiny is 
literally written in stone."'''
Mexico is important to the United States as a source of oil, as a 
source of trade, and as the homeland of nearly nine million Americans. In 
1976, with its discovery of major new oil fields, Mexico became important 
to the U. S. as a close and stable supply of oil providing an alternative 
to reliance on Middle Eastern supplies. U. S. - Mexican trade in imports 
and exports has grown until Mexico is the United States’ third largest 
trading partner. Each year, in addition to legal immigrants, 500,000 to
800,000 undocumented Mexican workers come to the United States. These are 
the major issues confronting the United States and Mexico. Problems of 
lesser magnitude include drug control, water quality, and pollution. 
Because Mexico has such an impact on the United States it is important to 
be aware of the problems facing the two nations.
The goal of this thesis is to provide readers who have little 
background in U. S. - Mexican affairs with a knowledge of U. S. - Mexican 
history and of the prominent issues that currently concern the two 
countries. Chapter I will examine how events of the past influence the 
present relationship with Mexico. The remaining chapters will provide a 
fairly detailed account of three areas of major importance in the U. S. -
1
2
Mexican relationship: trade, oil, and immigration. These chapters will 
begin with the Carter - Lopez Portillo presidencies in 1976, a date which 
coincides with Mexico’s new oil discoveries.
It is the thesis of this paper that: (1) relations between the United 
States and Mexico are generally friendly, although persistent problems over 
trade, oil, and immigration often give the appearance of a quarrelsome, 
troubled relationship; and (2) economics is basic to the U. S. - Mexican 
relationship. Trade, oil, and immigration are all issues rooted in 
economics.
Themes rising out of U. S. - Mexican history can be traced through 
the controversies involving trade and oil. It will be seen that the 
United States has dominated Mexico since its independence in 1821, first 
in territorial matters and then in economic areas. While the United 
States has exerted great influence over Mexico's development, Mexico 
remains of secondary importance to the United States. Particularly since 
World War II, American attention has shifted from Mexico to East - West 
concerns. Mexican resentment of U. S. dominance, however, still influences 
events today.
Footnotes
^"Toast by Secretary Kissinger, Mexico City, June 11," Department 




Relations between the United States and Mexico from the 1940's into 
the 1970's were cordial. However, for most of the preceding century the 
history of the two nations was marred by suspicion and hostility. From 
the time of the Texas Revolution in 1836 to the expropriation of oil lands 
in 1938, the United States and Mexico were involved in a number of serious 
and, at times, violent disputes. During those times, Mexicans feared that 
the United States, with its wealth and power, was intent on gaining control 
of their country. While early conflicts were over boundary lines, by the 
late nineteenth century business and property rights were at the center of 
the disagreements.
Though the hostilities of the century following Mexico's indepen­
dence created distrust on both sides of the border, the period is better 
remembered in Mexico. Mexican affairs no longer dominate the U. S. 
horizon, and old antagonisms are mostly forgotten. To Mexico, however, 
the extent of U. S. influence is still a concern, and the past is not so 
easily dismissed.
At the time of Mexico's independence in 1821, the United States had 
already expanded beyond the Mississippi. Mexico's first president, 
Guadalupe Victoria, made suspicious of American intentions by talk that 
the boundary with Mexico was not the Sabine River (as the 1821 treaty with 
Spain specified) but possibly the Rio Grande, characterized the citizens
4
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of the United States as ambitious people, without a spark of good faith,
always ready to encroach upon adjacent territory**'
Nonetheless, Mexico allowed United States citizens led by Stephen
Austin to settle in Texas. The hope was that the immigrants would be
peacefully integrated, but political, religious and cultural differences
hindered assimilation. The U. S. immigrants, numbering 30,000 by 1835,
were alarmed when President Santa Anna annulled the 1824 Constitution and
began centralizing the government, depriving them of control over local
affairs. Texas rebelled and declared its independence on March 2, 1836.
One month later, the Texas Revolution ended with the defeat of the Mexican
army near the San Jacinto River. Texas then established the Lone Star
Republic and remained independent for nine years from 1836 to 1845. During
this time Mexico refused to recognize the Republic, but was unable to force
Texas back into its fold.
Expansionists in the United States would have annexed Texas, but,
partly out of fear of provoking a war with Mexico and partly because of
entanglement in the slavery issue, annexation was delayed until 1845.
Spurred by the election of James K. Polk, who had run on a platform
including annexation, the Congress finally passed an annexation resolution
in February, 1845. Upon passage of the resolution, the Mexican minister
in Washington immediately lodged a protest and departed for Mexico.
Within a month, his American counterpart had returned to Washington and
2the two nations were preparing for war.
Attempts to negotiate a settlement to the annexation dispute focused 
on the western boundary of Texas. The Nueces River had been the border 
since colonial times. When Moses Austin was granted his concession to
6
settle Texas, the boundary was the Nueces River; again, when the grant was
extended to Stephen Austin, the boundary was the Nueces River. Yet, Texas
claimed the Rio Grande as the western boundary on these grounds: first,
some U. S. immigrants had been allowed to settle between the Nueces and
the Rio Grande; and second, after his defeat at San Jacinto, Santa Anna
had ordered his troops back across the Rio Grande, not the Nueces.
If Texas was successful in this claim, the new boundary would add
not only the 150 miles between the Rio Grande and Nueces, but also half of
New Mexico and Colorado. When Texas entered the Union, Polk decided to
support the Texas claim to the Rio Grande boundary. He sent an envoy, John
Slidell, to Mexico City to discuss the claim with Mexico's President Herrera.
In addition, Slidell was instructed to negotiate the purchase of California
and the remainder of New Mexico. Indignant protests in the Mexican press,
and threats to overthrow Herrera if he acceded to the American demands, led
3to the termination of the Slidell mission.
Shortly after Slidell returned to Washington, hostilities began. 
President Polk had ordered General Zachary Taylor's troops into the dis­
puted territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. Taylor ignored a 
Mexican order to withdraw, and instead advanced all the way to the Rio 
Grande. He was involved in a skirmish in which sixteen of his men were 
killed or wounded. This gave Polk the excuse he needed to pursue a war 
with Mexico. He went to the Congress with the message, "...after reiterat­
ed menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has 
invaded our territory, and shed American blood on American soil. She has 
proclaimed that hostilities exist, and that the two nations are now at
4war." This view differed substantially from Mexico's. From the Mexican
7
side of the Nueces, it appeared that the Americans had taken Texas,
changed the boundary to double its size, and, when Mexico resisted this
5action, accused Mexico of invading the United States.
The Mexican War began in 1846 and ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo signed on February 2, 1848. Although hard-fought battles partially
saved Mexican honor, the U. S. armies eventually captured Mexico City.
Mexico paid dearly for the war. The treaty ceded to the United States all
Mexican territory north and west of the Rio Grande. This included Texas,
the California territory, and the New Mexico territory. In return the
United States paid Mexico $15,000,000 and assumed the claims of U. S.
citizens against the Mexican government.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo basically established the U. S. -
Mexican border as it exists today. The only subsequent major changes
came in the Gadsden Purchase in 1854. Badly in need of funds, Santa Anna
agreed to sell the Mesilla Valley (today southern New Mexico and Arizona)
for $10,000,000.
The Texas Revolution and the Mexican War produced long-lasting
distrust and hostility between the United States and Mexico. Two incidents
of the Texas Revolution combined to crystalize U. S. opposition to Mexico:
the deaths, to the last man, of a Texas force at the famous battle of the
Alamo; and Santa Anna's order to execute 365 Texas prisoners of war as 
6pirates.
The War also created martyrs for Mexico. In a major offensive at 
Veracruz, General Winfield Scott laid siege to the city, denying all 
pleas to allow women, children, and noncombatants to evacuate. However, 
the heroes of the war were the Boy Heroes of Chapultepec. The cadets of 
Chapultepec Castle were reportedly the last defenders of Mexico City
before its fall ended the war. Many of the cadets died rather than 
surrender.
The Mexican War strengthened the stereotypes that the United States 
and Mexico held about each other. American historians subsequently wrote 
of the U. S. duty to regenerate a backward people and fulfill Manifest
0
Desitny. Devastated and humiliated by the loss of half their territory, 
Mexicans became more hostile than ever to the United States. Fears and 
hatred of the United States ran deep and were reflected in folk songs of . 
the period. The intellectual community's criticism of U. S. imperialism 
added respectability to the prevailing Yankeephobia.^
Lincoln through Diaz - Growing Ties
Relations between the United States and Mexico began to improve under
Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Benito Juarez. When Juarez was deposed by
the French and replaced by Archduke Maximillian of Hapsburg, the United
8States continued to recognize Juarez' exiled republican government. The
French occupation of Mexico ended in February, 1867, and by May the Second
Mexican Empire had fallen to the republicans. Benito Juarez returned to 
9Mexico City.
The Liberal government was restored for a short time. Then in 1876, 
Porfirio Diaz overthrew Juarez' successor, President Sebastian Lerdo de 
Tejada, and established himself as President. For the next third of a 
century, Diaz controlled Mexico’s destiny.
The United States refused to recognize Porfirio Diaz pending the 
resolution of several problems between the two nations. The first was the 
settlement of U. S. claims against Mexico. This problem was quickly solved, 
and Mexico began making payments in January, 1877. More serious was the
question of border raids. Groups of Indians and bandits from Mexico were 
crossing the border, attacking U. S. settlements and driving cattle herds 
back into Mexico. Diaz refused to accept any responsibility for preventing 
the thefts.^
Continued border violations combined with the American policy of 
pursuing the raiders into Mexico nearly brought the two countries to war 
by the summer of 1877. Tensions began to subside when President Diaz 
finally ordered additional troops to guard the frontier. The United States, 
at last convinced that the Diaz administration intended to establish order 
and meet its foreign obligations, recognized Diaz in May, 1878,^ Spurred 
by growing economic ties, relations continued to improve for the remainder 
of the Diaz era.
Diaz believed sound economic health was the answer to Mexico's
domestic problems. Since there was little available capital in Mexico,
foreign investment was encouraged. Within a generation, the framework of
a modern economy was in place. With the help of U. S. and British capital,
Mexico built railroads, banks, heavy industry, a sound currency, and
12established excellent credit abroad.
Although official relations between the United States and Mexico 
improved steadily after the Mexican War, the Mexican poeple continued to 
distrust U. S. influence. Labor and the church both objected to foreign 
"colonization" by which U. S. investment in Mexico exceeded the investments 
of the Mexicans themselves. The American economic invasion was seen as a 
threat to Mexico's national interests.
The U. S. Role in the Mexican Revolution
Capital improvements made during the Diaz era did not improve
10
conditions for the masses of Mexico. The new wealth benefitted only 
foreigners and the upper classes. Foreigners, in control of business and 
large amounts of agricultural land, were given preferred treatment by the 
police courts. Opposition to Diaz grew. In the Revolution that followed, 
the United States under President Woodrow Wilson intervened several times.
Political opposition to Diaz began when he announced that he would 
not be a candidate in the 1910 election. Diaz soon changed his mind, 
however, and had his opponent, Francisco I. Madero, jailed. On his release, 
Madero fled to the United States where he issued a plan of revolution call­
ing for land reform, social justice, and a single-term presidency. Within
six months the government had fallen. Diaz resigned on May 25, 1911, and
13sailed for Europe. Madero was elected President that fall.
President William Howard Taft quickly recognized Madero's government, 
but Madero was soon challenged by impatient social reformers within 
Mexico. In the space of a year five rebellions against him broke out.
The Madero government was overthrown by a military coup led by 
Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz. For nine days neither the rebels nor the 
government troops could gain a clear advantage. Then General Victoriano 
Huerta, Madero's commanding general, switched sides. Huerta ordered one 
of his generals to arrest the president, his brother and most of his 
cabinet.^
U. S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson mediated between Madero and 
Huerta in the hope of reestablishing a peace that would guard the safety 
of U.S. citizens and business interests. Wilson was not an impartial 
mediator, however. Earlier, he had demanded that Madero resign and 
informed Huerta's representatives that the United States would recognize 
any regime that could restore order to Mexico.^ Some accounts say
11
Wilson actually conducted a meeting in which Generals Diaz and Huerta
agreed to overthrow Madero. The agreement made public at the U. S. Embassy
16is known as the Pact of the Embassy.
In any event, Huerta secured Madero's resignation on February 18, 1913,
and had himself sworn in as president. As Madero was being driven from the
Presidential palace to the penitentiary, he was assassinated. The official
version of the death maintained that Madero was killed in the confusion when
17a group of his supporters tried to free him.
The Madero assassination turned U. S. opinion against Huerta. The 
Taft administration left the question of recognizing Huerta to Woodrow 
Wilson. Despite Ambassador Wilson's urging, President Wilson refused to 
recognize Huerta. In fact, the President did everything he could to see 
Huerta out of office. He believed that Huerta's government failed to meet 
the requirements for legitimacy outlined in the Mexican Constitution and 
was therefore unworthy of recognition.
President Wilson indirectly supported the Constitutionalist opposi­
tion to Huerta (Venustiano Carranza, Pancho Villa, Alvaro Obregon, and
Emiliano Zapata) by lifting the ban on arms exports, thus allowing
18munitions from the United States to reach the Constitutionalists.
Wilson made various offers of help to Carranza, but Carranza was unwill-
19ing to compromise his position by inviting U. S. control of the Revolution.
Wilson dealt the Huerta regime its final blow in the spring of 1914 
when he ordered the occupation of Veracruz. The occupation was the 
result of an incident in the port of Tampico where a party of sailors from 
the USS Dolphin had been arrested for wandering into a restricted area.
Though the sailors were released within an hour with an official apology,
12
U. S. Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo demanded that the Mexicans present a
twenty-one gun salute to the American flag. President Wilson supported
these demands. When Mexico refused to salute,the United States planned a
naval demonstration.^
The plan was revised when it was learned that a munitions shipment
for Huerta had been received at Veracruz. President Wilson decided to
21capture the munitions and ordered Veracruz to be taken. Mexican 
casualties exceeded 300, including civilians. Nineteen American marines 
and sailors died.
The American occupation of Veracruz from April to November contribut­
ed to Huerta's resignation by blocking federal revenues from the custom­
house. Huerta's military, economic, and diplomatic strength were all
deteriorating, but in his resignation statement of July 8, 1914, Huerta
22placed primary responsibility for what had happened on Wilson.
In the chaotic years following Huerta's resignation, the factions of 
the Revolution began to fight among themselves. In October, 1915, Presi­
dent Wilson again interfered by recognizing General Carranza's de facto
government. In so doing, Wilson ignored the claims of Pancho Villa who
23was still in control of part of the country. Villa, who had been 
courting the United States for years, determined to take revenge. In two 
separate 1916 incidents, Villistas attacked a train in Chihuahua killing 
fifteen Americans and crossed into New Mexico to burn the town of 
Columbus, killing 18 Americans.
With popular backing, President Wilson ordered a punitive expedition 
under General John J. Pershing to pursue Villa, but First Chief Carranza 
ordered the expedition out of Mexico. After a skirmish with Carranza's
13
24troops raised tensions, the Pershing expedition withdrew. The incident
seemed to threaten a war between the United States and Mexico which neither
government wanted. As the United States drew nearer to war with Germany,
President Wilson no longer had time to deal with Mexican problems and
25turned his attention to Europe.
By 1917 Carranza had consolidated his position and was elected
President. After giving assurances that U. S. property would be protected,
26Carranza was recognized de jure by Wilson in August, 1917.
While the events of 1910 to 1917 sharpened animosities on both sides
of the border, they have been forgotten in the United States today. In
Mexico, however, the occupation of Veracruz and U. S. intervention in the
Revolution left a legacy of resentment that still arouses suspicions
27toward the United States.
The years following the Mexican Revolution continued to be marked by 
strife between the United States and Mexico. Problems of recognition, oil 
rights and protection of U. S. business interests remained unsettled.
In 1920 Alvaro Obregon was elected to a four year term as president 
of Mexico after joining a revolt against Carranza that forced Carranza to 
flee the capital. Newly-elected United States President Warren G. Harding, 
under the influence of a group of senators, refused to recognize the 
Obregon government unless it agreed in writing to protect American citizens 
and their property rights in Mexico. The senators were concerned by 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution under which all subsoil properties 
belonged to the Mexican state. The United States refused to recognize 
Obregon's government for three years until after the Bucareli Conference 
in 1923. Then at the Conference it was agreed that oil lands would not
14
be seized under Article 27 if a "positive act" to drill oil had been taken
28before May 1, 1917.
However, Plutarco Elias Calles, elected in 1924, ordered the oil 
companies to exchange their titles of ownership for fifty year leases. 
Enforcement of the law brought relations almost to the breaking point. The 
controversy was settled by U. S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow who suggested 
that the matter by settled in the Mexican courts. An official release of 
the U. S. government acknowledged that the petroleum controversy had been 
solved by the Mexican government. The United States had finally recognized 
full Mexican sovereignty even where U. S. interests were involved.
The question of oil again surfaced during the Lazaro Cardenas admin­
istration. In 1938 Cardenas nationalized the foreign oil companies when 
they refused to obey a Supreme Court decision to honor a labor contract.
The President maintained that the companies had flagrantly defied the
29sovereignty of the Mexican state.
The oil companies used legal, propaganda, and economic weapons to 
fight the expropriation, but for all intents and purposes the two govern­
ments remained stalemated over the oil question until 1941. Just before 
World War II, the United States and Mexico signed a General Agreement that
had been in the making for months. The Agreement settled oil and agrarian
30claims and worked out a trade treaty.
United States - Mexican affairs had begun to improve slightly in 
the late twenties with the ambassadorship of Dwight Morrow and continued 
to improve throughout the Good Neighbor era of the Roosevelt presidency. 
When Franklin Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, he abandoned the policy of 
intervention which had produced little more than resentment. U. S.
15
acceptance of Mexico’s oil expropriation emphasized the change in U. S. 
policies. ̂
The Postwar Years - Improved Relations
With the issues of oil rights, property damages, and intervention
out of the way by World War II, each country turned its attention elsewhere.
Mexico entered a period of great economic growth while the United States
32became more involved with global problems. Tensions relaxed and relations
between the two countries were usually friendly until the 1970’s. Boundary
and water issues that had been a source of friction for years were finally
settled during this period.
The Chamizal controversy, which was settled in 1963, dated back to
1864 when the Rio Grande suddenly shifted south. The change in the river’s
course transferred 600 acres of land from Mexico to Texas. Arbitration
Commissions had never been able to settle the Chamizal dispute properly;
Mexicans regarded the Chamizal as evidence of Yankee imperialism. In the
summer of 1963, the Chamizal problem was finally settled. Lyndon Johnson
and Lopez Mateos formalized the agreement in September, 1964, after John 
33Kennedy’s death.
An agreement to control the salinity of the Colorado River was also 
reached. According to a 1944 water treaty the United States is required 
to send 1.5 million acre-feet of agricultural quality Colorado River water 
to Mexico annually. The postwar growth of the American Southwest put great 
strains on the water supply. By 1960 the Colorado River water reaching 
Mexico was damaging the productivity of Mexican farms because it was too 
salty after being used for irrigation in the United States. Although the 
United States spent millions from 1961 to 1972 to improve the water
16
quality, it was still too salty.
By the early 1970’s the problem was acute enough that President Luis
Echeverria declared the salinity of the Colorado River to be the major
issue between the two countries. Finally, in 1972 President Richard Nixon
agreed to large-scale desalinization of the Colorado. The agreement was
enacted by Congress in the 1974 Colorado River Basin Salinity Act thus
settling the controversy.^
Other areas of concern have been resolved with cooperative programs.
Narcotics control is conducted through joint investigations by U. S. and 
35Mexican agencies. Pollution problems along the boundary are studied by
the International Boundary and Water Commission. Consultative mechanisms
established in 1976 consider common problems in trade, investment, energy
and minerals, tourism, and areas of social concern. With cooperation on
these issues and also on numerous routine matters such as coordination of
37air traffic control and protection of cultural property, relations 
remain basically sound. However, by the early 1970’s the friendship was 
showing signs of strain.
Mexico’s president, Luis Echeverria, acting as a Third World spokes­
man, promoted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties at the United 
Nations in 1974. The Charter detailed the desires of the less developed 
countries for a new international economic order. Although President Ford 
complimented Echeverria on the "very great merit and very great support" 
that the Charter had, the United States voted agianst it because of 
objections to two clauses. One gave every state the right to expropriate 
foreign property and pay only whatever compensation was deemed adequate by 
its own laws. The other gave states the right to form associations of
17
producers of primary products such as the Organization of Petroleum Export­
ing Countries. The United States vote was in line with long-standing and
well-known American policies, but following Ford's public statements it
38came as a disappointment to Mexico.
At the same time, Echeverria's role as a Third World spokesman was
frowned upon in the United States. A group of Congressmen became so
concerned that they issued President Ford a warning that Mexico was
39"going communist."
It was expected that the atmosphere would improve with the presiden­
cies of Jimmy Carter and Jose Lopez Portillo, who were both elected in
1976. As a sign of goodwill, Carter invited Lopez Portillo to be the
40first foreign leader he received. However, by 1977 differences over
natural gas sales and immigration had clouded relations between the two.
In 1976 Mexico discovered large new deposits of oil and gas and in
1977 made arrangements to sell two million cubic feet of natural gas to a
group of United States companies. The Carter administration refused to
41sanction the sale because it felt the Mexican price was too high. This
move embarrassed President Lopez Portillo, who had insisted on constructing
an 1,100 mile pipeline to Texas for the purpose of selling Mexican gas to
42the United States. The dispute over the price of natural gas was 
eventually settled in 1979.
The issue of immigration, which also marred Carter's relations with 
Lopez Portillo, is a persistent problem that seems to defy solution. It 
was one of the biggest areas of concern in U. S. - Mexican relations in 
the 1970's.
The most recent immigration crisis resulted from a 1976 change in 
the U. S. immigration laws which cut the number of legal Mexican immigrants
18
43allowed to 20,000 per year. Prior to the change Mexico had been allowed
40,000 immigrants per year, and with the preference system for relatives
44the actual number of immigrants allowed was about 60,000.
In an attempt to enforce the new, lower limit, the Carter administra­
tion extended the border fence by six miles causing an uproar in Mexico
45over the "tortilla curtain." A bill submitted by President Carter to
enforce the immigration laws without first consulting Mexico caused a
46further setback in relations.
After Ronald Reagan came to office, attention shifted from problems
of immigration and energy to differences in foreign policy. Mexico has
always tried to maintain independence from Washington where its foreign
policy is concerned. Because of its experiences with the United States,
and earlier with France, nonintervention has been the mainstay of Mexico's
foreign policy. Mexico has consistently opposed U. S. interference in
other Latin American nations including Guatemala, the Dominican Republic,
47and Cuba. During the Cuban Missile Crisis President Lopez Mateos refused
to go along with U. S. condemnation of the Castro regime, and Mexico voted
against Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of American States. In
spite of dissent over Mexico's independent foreign policy, the United
48States and Mexico remained on good terms.
In this tradition, Mexico has expressed increasing concern about the 
conflict in Central America. Mexico, along with Panama, Venezuela and 
Colombia— the Contadora Group— has tried to bring negotiated settlements 
to the conflicts in Central America. The Reagan administration has 
ignored or downplayed the Contadora Group's efforts, endorsing the search 
for peace while financing covert war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
19
49and increasing military aid to El Salvador. However, the United States
and Mexico have publicly minimized differences of opinion, emphasizing the
mutual belief that economic and social problems are at the root of regional 
50difficulties.
Though differences with Mexico in the past few years seem sharp, they 
are only part of the normal ups and downs experienced by the United States 
and Mexico during the postwar era. Problems which cause great alarm when 
they arise, such as narcotics control and Colorado River salinity, are 
eventually ironed out and seen as evidence of the cooperative spirit 
existing between the two countries. Even the decade of the seventies, 
which seemed relatively contentious, produced positive developments. Coop­
eration on narcotics control continues, and the associated problem of 
treatment of U. S. citizens arrested in Mexico was also settled by a 
treaty of 1976. In 1979 after the IXTOC I oil spill in the Bay of Campeche 
was capped, a joint marine pollution contingency plan was worked out."^
Other problems such as immigration, trade issues, and energy are of 
such magnitude as to seem virtually insoluable. They will continue to be 
a source of friction in the relationship, but efforts to reach agreement, 
or at least compromise, are continually underway. Thus, the cordial tone 
present in U. S. - Mexican relations since World War II is likely to 
continue even in the face of these problems. The attitudes of the past, 
however, have not been completely abandoned. At times old suspicions 
influence present policies. The Mexican government has to work around an 
anti-American nationalism when dealing with the United States. Especially 
in the fields of trade and oil, Mexican law attempts to limit foreign 
control in order to prevent a repeat of the economic invasion of the Diaz 
era.
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Trade is an important element in the U. S. - Mexican relationship.
It provides contact between the people of the two nations through border 
trade, tourism, investment transactions, and the export-import trade; it 
is the basis on which the countries deal with one another. Though trade 
is advantegeous to both the United States and Mexico, it is more essential 
to Mexico than to the United States. Mexico has worked to limit its 
economic dependence on foreign countries since its Revolution, and has 
largely succeeded. However, United States business and banking are still 
essential to Mexican prosperity. While both countries wish to promote a 
healthy, growing Mexican eocnomy, their approach is not always the same. 
This chapter will look at the role trade plays between the United States 
and Mexico, and review how differences and similarities in trade policies 
affect relations.
Although the United States and Mexico have not had a bilateral trade 
treaty since 1950, a large volume of trade is conducted despite the lack 
of any mutually agreed upon formal procedures. In 1981 U. S. - Mexican 
merchandise trade amounted to over $30 billion.
Mexico depends on the United States for trade to a far greater 
degree than the United States depends on Mexico. While Mexico is a 
valuable trading partner for the United States, it supplies the U. S. 
with only 3 to 5 percent of its imports and purchases only 4 to 7 percent
23
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of U. S. exports.^ The United States, on the other hand, is Mexico's
i
closest trading partner supplying about 63 percent of its imports and
buying about 60 percent to 70 percent of its exports (see Table 1,
United States-Mexican Trade).
Mineral fuels and related materials are the United States' biggest
imports from Mexico counting for over half of all goods imported from
Mexico in 1980 (see Table 2, Composition of United States-Mexican Trade).
Even so oil supplied by Mexico represents only 5 percent of U. S. national 
2consumption. Other commodities imported from Mexico by the United States 
include tropical agricultural products (e.g. cotton, coffee), farm products 
(e.g. strawberries and winter vegetables), and minerals including copper,
3lead and zinc.
While the United States imports mostly raw materials and food from 
Mexico, capital goods are Mexico's chief import from the United States. 
Mexico will have to continue importing large quantities of machinery in 
order to sustain its growth rate and fulfill its plans to develop industry, 
agriculture, and energy resources. Much of this equipment will come from
the United States. Thus, Mexico relies on U. S. imports to implement its
development plans making the composition of imports, as well as the quan­
tity, a factor in Mexico's dependence on the United States.
Besides relying on the United States for trade in goods, Mexico draws 
70 percent of its tourist and border sales from U. S. customers, and makes 
nearly 100 percent of its similar purchases in the United States.”*
Tourism is an important export for both nations, ranking second behind 
machinery and transport equipment for the U. S. and behind mineral fuels 
and lubricants for Mexico.
Table 1
UNITED STATES - MEXICAN TRADE
sl bMexico United States
Exports to U.S. Imports from U.S. Exports to Mexico Imports from Mexico 
Total Exports Total Imports Total Exports Total Imports
1975 58% 63% 4.8% 3.1%
1976 57% 63% 4.3% 2.9%
1977 60% 64% 4.0% 3.1%
1978 66% 60% 4.6% 3.5%
1979 69% 63% 5.4% 4.2%
1980 63% 66% 6.9% 5.1%
1981 60% 81%
ciU.S., Department of Commerce, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, Trade 
Information and Analysis, International Trade Administration, "United States Foreign 
Trade Annual 1975-1981," Overseas Business Reports, July, 1983, p. 30.
"United States Trade with Major Trading Partners 1974-1980," Overseas Business 




COMPOSITION OF UNITED STATES - MEXICAN TRADE 
1980 United States Exports to Mexico
Commodity Value in Dollars
Food and Live Animals .....................  1 908 335 291
Beverages and Tobacco   2 630 206
Crude Materials-Inedible, Except Fuel ....  1 078 683 974
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants, Etc  340 863 046
Animal & Vegetable Oils, Fats & Waxes ..... 90 273 751
Chemicals & Related Products NSPF   1 441 454 415
Manufactured Goods by Chief Material ...... 2 063 395 099
Machinery and Transport Equipment ......... 6 563 454 045
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles   856 575 269
Comm & Trans Not Classified Elsewhere  535 768 147
TOTAL 14 884 767 863
SOURCE: U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, U. S. Exports, World Area by Commodity Groupings, 
Annual 1980.
1980 United States Imports from Mexico
Commodity Value in Dollars
Food and Live Animals    1 316 199 557
Beverages and Tobacco   98 236 877
Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuel .... 208 910 092
Minerals, Fuels, Lubrcnts & Reltd Matrl ... 6 592 592 893
Oils and Fats, Animal and Vegetable   3 756 650
Chemicals and Related Products, NSPF ...... 275 147 484
Manufactured Goods by Chief Material   762 621 146
Machinery & Transport Equipment ........... 2 046 961 216
Miscellaneous Mfrd Articles, NSPF   870 283 481
Articles Not Provided for Elsewhere  344 757 844
TOTAL 12 519 467 240
SOURCE: U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, U. S. General Imports, World Area by Commodity 
Groupings, Annual 1980.
27
In addition, 70 percent of all direct foreign investment in Mexico is 
from the United States; however, foreign investment accounts for only about 
4 percent of Mexico's total private investment. In 1979 the United States 
had about $5.8 billion invested in Mexico out of a total U. S. overseas 
investment of $192.6 billion.^ These figures show that while U. S. invest­
ment in Mexico is substantial, it is not an overwhelming force. Nonetheless, 
it is vital to the growth of Mexico's manufacturing sector— the area to 
which Mexican law funnels most foreign capital.
Mexico is obviously valuable to the United States as a trade partner, 
but the United States is not dependent on Mexico. In contrast, Mexico 
relies mainly on the United States as a customer for its exports, as a 
supplier for its imports, and as a source of outside capital. This has 
been a basic element of U. S. - Mexican relations since the time of Diaz, 
a fact that Mexico would like to alter. The disparity between the United 
States and Mexico in the trade relationship gives Mexico good reason to 
distrust U. S. influence over its economy.
United States Trade Policy
The stated foreign policy objectives of the United States regarding 
Mexico reflect the importance of trade to the relationship. Objectives 
include:
1. Maintaining friendly relations and cooperation between Mexico 
and the United States.
2. Cooperating in developing a modern economy, linked with other 
countries of the hemisphere}including the U. S., through a 
mutually beneficial system of trade and investment.
3. Encouraging U. S. private investment in the form needed for 
Mexico's growth; and
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4. Settling differences in .the spirit of mutual respect and 
neighborly understanding.
Speaking specifically of foreign trade policies, the United States,
particularly under the Reagan administration, favors noninterventionist
policies that allow market forces to distribute trade and investment. The
United States would like to see nontarrif barriers and export subsidies
eliminated, particularly in the two most important areas of American
9competitiveness— high technology and agriculture. The U. S. is also
interested in having barriers to trade inservices reduced. The United
States believes that these goals could be accomplished through the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which it would like to see
strengthened and expanded to increase participation of the developing 
10nations.
Trade between the United States and Mexico has no firm treaty struc­
ture, but most Mexican imports to the United States are subject to the 
"most favored nation" provision of the Tariff Agreements Act of 1934 and 
the Generalized System of Preferences in the Trade Act of 1974, amended by 
the Trade Agreement of 1979.
As a most favored nation, Mexico benefits from all trade concessions 
which the United States grants to any other trade partners that are also 
most favored nations. The Generalized System of Preferences enables 
countries, mostly underdeveloped nations, to send exports to the United 
States free of duties.
President Gerald Ford implemented the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) as provided for in the Trade Act of 1974 on January 1, 
1976. It basically divided all U. S. imports when exported by certain 
developing countries into three categories: those not eligible for
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duty-free GSP treatment, those eligible for such treatment, and those 
eligible except as limited by competitive need provisions.
Competitive need excludes a nation's exports of a product from 
duty-free GSP treatment when the product accounts for 50 percent or more 
of U. S. imports of the item, or when exports of the item from the country 
totalled $25 million the preceding year. This figure is annually adjusted 
upward according to growth rate of U. S. gross national product. In 
addition, to be eligible for GSP the cost or value of materials produced 
in the exporting country plus direct cost of processing operations per­
formed there must equal at least 50 percent of the appraised value at the
time of entry into U. S. customs territory. The minimum content was
12originally 35 percent.
Mexico is the fourth largest utilizer of U. S. GSP with over $639 
million of goods sold duty-free in 1981. However, only 7 or 8 percent of 
annual Mexican exports to the United States have ever entered duty-free 
under GSP. Of the one-fourth or so of Mexican exports that are eligible 
for U. S. GSP every year, about 30 percent are not qualified--usually 
because they fail to meet the 50 percent minimum content limit. Another
1340 percent by value are denied GSP due to the competitive need limitation.
In 1981 the United States began a system of "graduation" under which
duty-free treatment for more economically advanced developing countries
was limited on a product-by-product basis. Graduation is intended to
expand GSP benefits for less competitive developing countries. It was
14accelerated in 1982.
Mexico is critical of the competitive need restrictions on GSP and 
strongly opposes the graduation concept. In 1982 five of Mexico's 
products worth $85 million were "graduated.
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Because the United States is a signatory of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs, some of Mexico's exports to the United States are 
subject to GATT regulations as well as most favored nation and GSP provi­
sions. The GATT regulations can be a problem for Mexico, which subsidises 
industries to promote growth, because GATT allows countervailing duties to 
be imposed in the case of export subsidies. If goods are exported at 
prices below those on the domestic market or sold at less than the estimated 
cost of production, anti-dumping duties can be imposed by the United States. 
In the case of countries that do not adhere to GATT, U. S. law allows 
countervailing duties to be levied on dutiable articles without a determina­
tion of material injury to U. S. producers. If the article is duty-free,
however, material injury to the U. S. industry must be proved before a
16countervailing duty is imposed.
Along the border there is a special category of trade known as
"in-bond" industries or maquiladoras. In 1965 this trade was established
by Mexico in Free Trade Zones near the northern border to help solve the
17immigration problem. Since 1972 the maquiladoras have been allowed to 
locate anywhere in Mexico, but 90 percent of the 600 or more plants are 
still located in border cities. The maquiladoras produce finished goods 
from components imported from the United States and reexported for sale.
The plants operate under a variety of exemptions from Mexican law
18including blanket authorization for 100 percent foreign ownership.
The reciprocal provisions of U. S. law are Sections 806 and 807 of 
the U. S. Tariff Schedule which allow goods produced in the United States 
to be shipped to Mexico for assembly and reexported to the United States 
paying duty only on the value-added through production in Mexico. This
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allows the labor-intensive phase of U. S. manufacturing to be performed in 
M j 19Mexico.
Although U. S. labor groups oppose Sections 806 and 807 on the
grounds that they transfer U. S. jobs to lower-wage foreign production,
United Stated Government analysts disagree. They believe that the in-
bond industries benefit U. S. labor by preventing the entire production
20operation from moving off shore. The maquiladoras program also benefits
21Mexican labor, employing about 120,000 people (1980).
Mexican Trade Policy
Mexico's recent foreign trade policy includes the following:
1) protection of national industry, 2) promotion of exports, especially
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, 3) promotion of geographic and
commodity trade diversification, 4) discouragement of consumer goods
imports and preference for material and capital goods imports, and
225) rejection of GATT.
Mexico's general policy regarding imports is protectionist. Major
policy objectives are import substitution by domestic products as a
means to develop manufacturing industries, and diversification of trade to
acquire self-sufficiency, new markets, and new supply sources. Import
substitution is implemented through government purchasing policies, import
23licensing, and tariff barriers.
As part of a drive to develop export markets, Mexico had planned
to drop the import licensing system in favor of a tariff system by 1982.
The intention was to lessen protection, thus forcing local manufacturers
24over time to meet world market standards. However, in the summer of 
1981 Mexico reversed its trade liberalization policy in response to
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balance of payments problems. Import tariffs were raised, and by August,
251982, all imports again required an import license.
Tariff structures are also used to influence imports of consumer
and capital goods. Consumer goods which are produced by Mexican industry
are subject to tariff rates of 60 percent to 100 percent. Industrial
machinery needed for development purposes usually has a 20 percent duty,
and some products, including essential raw materials and agricultural
26products, are imported duty free.
With respect to GATT, Mexico decided in 1980 to postpone membership
indefinitely despite the favorable conditions provided by its Protocol of 
27Accession. The terms of the Protocol were considered extremely liberal. 
Mexico would have had twelve years to eliminate its import permits. Bi­
lateral tariff concessions negotiated with the United States in the Tokyo 
Round would have been incorporated into the agreement. The new Mexican 
system of tariff valuation was accepted. Mexico would have been allowed 
to continue granting tax incentives to industry, provided these did not 
harm other GATT members. Mexico was insured full rights to protect 
industry and agriculture, and GATT recognized Mexico's protectionist 
policy on rural products. Finally, Mexico would have had the right to
ignore any GATT provisions covering nontariff trade barriers that were
28incompatible with existing Mexican legislation.
President Lopez Portillo originally favored accession to GATT, but
after a national debate in which nationalists i.in the intellectual community,
protectionists in the private sector, and government planners opposed
Mexico's entry he changed his mind. Labor unions and mass-based groups
29were not heavily involved in the debate. On March 18, 1980, the
33
forty-second anniversary of the nationalization of the oil companies,
Lopez Portillo announced that Mexico would not accede as a contracting 
30member to GATT.
The GATT decision was based partly on a desire to protect small and
medium-scale industry, and partly on a preference for bilateralism in
relations with industrial countries. Mexico believes that bilateral
agreements provide a better opportunity than GATT to use petroleum as a
31weapon to gain trade advantages and acquire scarce technology. The
decision was also a reflection of Mexico's desire to maintain trading and
investment independence, especially from the United States. In the
United States, Mexico's decision caused surprise and anger, followed by a
32"wait and see" attitude.
To avoid foreign domination of its industry, as in the nineteenth
century, Mexico now has laws limiting foreign investment. Foreign
companies operating in Mexico must acquire permits in which they agree to
consider themselves as Mexican nationals subject to Mexican laws, and not
33to seek special protection from their own governments. Some industries
are not open to foreign participation. The petroleum and forest industries
are restricted solely to Mexican ownership, while as of 1961 the mining
industry must have majority Mexican ownership. In 1973, under Echeverria,
the laws were tightened to require majority Mexican participation in all
new investments except where it is in the national interest to waive the 
34requirement. Direct foreign investment is allowed if it does not
compete with domestic investment and if it brings otherwise unobtainable
35technology into the country. Foreign investment is particularly
36welcome if it will help reduce imports or expand exports.
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Policy Differences
Protectionist measures and domestic pressure to impose protectionist
policies in both Mexico and the United States are key trade issues which
continue to cause friction between the countries.
Besides being opposed to GSP restrictions on its exports, Mexico has
long been critical of U. S. tariff and non-tariff barriers which it feels
restrict its exports to the United States. As an example, Mexico believes
that U. S. restrictions on size and color are used to shut out its
37strawberry and tomato exports.
American business in turn complains of unfair advantages enjoyed by
Mexican exporters. As previously mentioned, the tariff laws are criticized
by some sectors in the United States for encouraging "runaway plants."
United States exporters object to Mexico's policy of supplementing high
tariff walls with an import licensing system to protect its industrial
sector from competition. In addition to tariffs and import licensing,
Mexico uses indirect controls such as domestic content requirements to
38protect industries, particularly the automotive industry. United States
agricultural producers believe that Mexico dumps winter vegetables on the 
39U. S. market. Tomatoes are a particular problem drawing annual objec­
tions from United States farmers, and creating hostile press in both 
40countries. Florida tomato growers petitioned for a ruling that Mexican
growers were contravening the 1921 Antidumping Act by selling at below
41cost in the United States, but in March, 1980, the Commerce Department
ruled that Mexican winter vegetables were not being dumped in the United
42States. Florida growers have appealed the decision.
Fishing is another trade area that has caused friction in recent 
years. Shrimp fishing in the Gulf of Mexico has been a source of conflict,
35
but the most recent problems involve Pacific Ocean tuna. In 1976 Mexico
extended its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to 200 miles. Since tuna are
migratory, fishing fleets must follow them wherever they go, and owners
of U. S. tuna boats claim they cannot afford the exorbitant license fees
required for fishing in Mexico’s EEZ. In July, 1980, Mexico seized
several U. S. tuna boats; in retaliation the United States banned the
43import of fish from Mexico. These actions threatened the three year old
44negotiations for United States access to Mexican waters.
In January, 1981, Mexico terminated all fishing accords with the
United States including accords on grouper and snapper as well as tuna.
Mexico's action was triggered by the United States' refusal to allocate
45Mexico more squid catch in the North Atlantic.
Although the extent of United States - Mexican trade serves to
bind the two countries together, it also creates numerous sources of
friction. Mexico feels that the United States is hampering its economic
development through the use of quality restrictions, quotas, anti-dumping
charges and tariffs. As Lopez Portillo stated in an address to the United
States Congress, restrictions on imports aggravate economic problems by
46causing unemployment. At the same time that Mexico urges the United 
States to relax trade restrictions on Mexican imports, it implements 
tariff and import licensing policies to block exports from the United 
States.̂
Trade relations between the United States and Mexico are made more 
difficult by historic factors and Mexico’s strong desire to establish 
economic independence. Despite the occasions for disagreement presented 
by trade it is an element that strengthens the ties between the two
36
countries. The extent of D, S. - Mexican trade is such that neither 
nation could easily afford a deterioration in relations; this has been 
increasingly true in the case of oil.
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With the discovery of enormous new oil deposits in 1976, Mexico 
became of more interest to the United States than it had been since 
before World War II. Mexico's oil provides an alternative to reliance on 
oil from the unstable Middle East. Though Mexico follows OPEC price 
policies, its oil is less expensive for the United States than OPEC oil 
because transportation costs are lower. Mexican oil has the advantages 
of being close, secure and plentiful— estimates of Mexico's proven 
reserves are still rising.
The story of Mexico's oil relations with foreign companies reveals 
how Mexico was dominated by outside interests at the beginning of this 
century, and how oil came to serve as a symbol of Mexican nationalism and 
sovereignty. Today Mexico's oil dealings are still partly shaped by 
nationalist sentiment. This chapter will detail the development of 
Mexico's oil resources from the days when the industry was controlled by 
foreign companies through the 1976 oil discovery, and examine U. S. and 
Mexican oil policies.
Oil is Mexico's largest export to the United States. Throughout 
this century it has also been one of the greatest sources of controversy 
between the countries, encompassing as it ddes both profits and pride.
Until the time of Porfirio Diaz, Mexico's law followed the 
Spanish tradition of vesting ownership of subsoil resources in the crown.
40
41
Then in order to obtain foreign investment, Diaz altered the law to
follow the Anglo-Saxon tradition of vesting subsoil ownership in the
owner of the surface property.
From 1901 to 1910 the Mexican oil industry fell under the control
of British and American investors who came to control over 70 percent of
Mexican crude production.^ Production was modest, but it picked up
during the next years with the advent of World War I and assembly line
production of automobiles. By 1921 Mexico was producing one-fourth of
the world's oil supply. However, during the decade of the twenties
Mexico's oil production dropped sharply, until by 1930 Mexico produced
only 3 percent of world oil. The decrease in production was partly due
to Mexican cutbacks and partly to increased oil activity in Texas,
California, Oklahoma, the Soviet Union and Venezuela. During the
twenties American oil interests in Mexico surpassed the British interests
to gain control of 77 percent of Mexican oil production. This was the
only time that American oil companies dominated the Mexican oil industry.
After 1934 new British discoveries once again made British interests 
opredominant.
The growth of the oil industry had occurred during the Mexican 
Revolution. The companies were not adversely affected by the war
3because the oil fields were remote from large-scale military activity.
By 1916, however, changes brought by the Revolution began to affect the 
oil industry. A technical commission appointed by Venestiano Carranza 
concluded, " . . .  it is only right that that which belongs to the nation—  
the subsoil resources of coal and oil— be restored to it."^
The Constitution of 1917, produced by the victorious Carranza
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faction, upheld the principle of private property so long as it served a 
social purpose. One reform embodied in the Constitution was the return 
to the Spanish custom of distinguishing surface property from subsoil 
property.
Article 27, paragraph iv, of the 1917 Constitution eliminated 
ownership rights to oil and coal reserves, though concessions could be 
obtained by Mexican citizens. Foreigners could also obtain concessions 
if they agreed to consider themselves as nationals and promised not to 
invoke the protection of their governments.^
In February, 1918, Carranza decreed that the subsoil petroleum 
belonged to the nation, and that parties wishing to exploit it must 
apply for concessions regardless of whether their leases or property 
titles had been formalized before 1917. The United States issued formal 
protests against the decree which changed land titles to mere concessions.
When the Carranza government was overthrown by a group of generals 
and Alvaro Obregon was elected president, the United States withheld 
recognition until the Obregon government recognized the property rights 
of American citizens in Mexico. The first two years of Obregon's term 
were filled with rumors of subversive activities sponsored by the oil 
firms, and of U. S. invasions of Mexico, also supposedly to be backed by 
the oil firms.
Obregon was caught between the need for U. S. recognition to help 
stabilize his government and the need to satisfy Mexican nationalists.
The Bucareli Conference in 1923 finally provided a solution to the 
problem. The United States recognized the change in the status of 
subsoil ownership from absolute property titles to "confirmatory
A3
concessions." In return Mexico agreed to such a broad definition of the 
"positive acts" principle that the oil companies were allowed to keep 
most of their property.^
The "positive acts" principle was embodied in five decisions of the 
Mexican Supreme Court regarding injunctions brought by the oil firms 
against the Carranza decrees. The Court ruled in 1921 that Article 27, 
paragraph iv, was not retroactive in the case of lands on which a 
"positive act" had been carried out. A positive act was some drilling 
or activity to indicate the "owners intention to extract oil prior to 
May 1, 1917," when the Constitution had taken effect.^
Obregon's successor, Plutarco Calles, brought relations nearly to 
the breaking point when he used a narrower interpretation of "positive 
acts" in demanding that the oil companies exchange their property titles 
for fifty year concessions to drill. According to some sources, 
Washington even considered invading Mexico in 1927 or lending support to
QMexican rebels.
Relations improved when President Calvin Coolidge appointed Dwight 
Morrow as the United States Ambassador to Mexico. Morrow worked out an 
agreement with Calles (1928) under which Mexico returned to the Bucareli 
Conference's broad definition of "positive acts." In exchange the 
United States agreed that future application of Mexico's oil laws would 
be settled in Mexican courts rather than through diplomatic intervention. 
This provision displeased the oil companies.^
The Morrow-Calles Agreement lasted until the Lazero Cardenas 
administration again took up the fight against foreign capital. Events 
beginning in 1936 changed Mexico's relations with the oil industry.
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First, an expropriation law aimed at essential industries was passed. 
However, the oil and mining industries were assured that they were safe 
from expropriation. Second, President Cardenas consolidated nineteen oil 
unions into one organization. It went on strike after the oil companies 
rejected its demands for higher wages and staffing provisions that would
l
have led to union control of the industry. The oil companies continued 
to disregard government insistence on higher salaries even after the 
government threatened to put the industry in the hands of official 
supervisors.^-® The companies finally agreed to the 26 million peso wage 
increase after the Mexican Supreme Court ordered them to comply, but the 
firms couldn't agree to the administrative clauses. The government decid­
ed that expropriation was the best way to protect its workers and sover­
eignty. On March 18, 1938, the expropriation of the oil industry was 
announced. The expropriation applied to only the surface lands because 
the oil itself already belonged to Mexico.^
The companies, however, regarded the subsoil deposits as their 
absolute property and demanded prompt indemnization. In retaliation for 
the expropriation of their property, the oil companies instigated a 
boycott to prevent the export of Mexican oil. The U. S. State Department
went along with the boycott. In addition, the United States suspended
1 ?its direct purchases of silver from Mexico. The protests eventually 
died down as the United States became involved in World War II, and 
worked out an agreement with Mexico.
The State Department began work on an agreement to assess the value 
of the nationalized property in 1941, but the United States, Mexico, and 
the oil companies all came up with different estimates of the property 
value. Included in the State Department estimate was the value of the
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subsoil hydrocarbons. By April, 1942, a joint commission had worked out 
an agreement which was finally accepted in October, 1943, by Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, the last U. S. oil company in Mexico. The agreement was 
signed a month later.
The Mexican government agreed to pay the oil companies $30 million 
in installments by 1947. Though the agreement never stated that it 
included payment for the value of subsoil deposits, in practice it did.
By not specifying whether the hydrocarbons were compensated for, the 
agreement made it possible for Mexico to assume that the oil companies 
acknowledged Mexico's ownership of the subsoil hydrocarbons. It was 
equally possible for the United States to assume that the agreement 
tacitly recognized ownerhsip by the oil companies since the companies 
were compensated for the oil.
The method of payments (installments) had been a source of
disagreement too, and Mexico won this part of the argument. The oil
companies originally had demanded prompt, effective, and adequate payment
1 3as traditionally provided under international law.
The settlement of the expropriation dispute was made possible by 
the international situation after 1940. The crisis in Europe and Asia 
required hemispheric unity and Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy had 
rejected the use of force, so Mexico finally felt safe from the rumored 
threats of U. S. invasion and subversion. Thanks largely to the pressures 
on Washington created by World War II, expropriation was established as 
an irreversible fact by 1943.-^
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Oil Relations
The nationalization of oil was an immensely popular move in 
Mexico— March 18 is celebrated as a holiday. However, Mexico could not 
keep up either production or exploration without outside capital and 
technical aid, which for several years were hard to obtain. Nonetheless, 
Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Pemex, kept the country supplied with 
fuel oil and gasoline until after 1957 when Mexico became a net importer 
of petroleum.
In the early 1970's Mexican oil production fell even further behind 
domestic demand. Imports, though still slight, increased. This increase 
in imported oil occurred just as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) raised prices. In 1972 Mexico's oil imports had cost 
$124 million; by 1974 the cost was $382 million. In addition to oil 
imports, President Echeverria had allowed high imports of supplies for 
the industrial plant in order to increase the pace of development. The 
imports were financed by increased foreign borrowing which led to infla-^ 
tion, balance of payments deficits, and devaluation of the peso.'*"'’
This economic crisis pushed the Mexican government into a decision 
to open oil sites explored as long ago as 1964.^  in 1975 Lopez Portillo 
announced the discovery of huge oil and gas deposits. Development of the 
oil fields eliminated the need to import oil, and the exports of oil 
temporarily improved the balance of payments situation. From 1976 to 
1977 Mexico's balance of payments deficit dropped from over $3 billion 
to less than $1.8 billion.^
As exploration has continued, the estimates of Mexico's reserves 
have continued to rise. Figures given by the Mexican government in 1980
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showed 60.1 billion barrels of proven reserves, 38 billion barrels of 
probable reserves, and 250 billion barrels of possible reserves. In his 
1981 Informe de Gobierno, Lopez Portillo announced another increase in 
proven reserves to 72 billion barrels.^
Mexico intended to develop its oil at a rate compatible with its 
economy and not in response to foreign desires for rapid expansion of oil 
production. The Mexican national program announced in 1980 set export 
limits of 1.5 million barrels per day for oil and 300 million barrels per 
day for gas through 1990. The program did not specify production limits, 
but tends to discourage sharp increases.
To avoid dependence on the United States, or any single country, 
as an export market the energy program aims for a limit of 50 percent of 
total oil exports sold to any one nation.-^ in the late seventies, 80 
percent of Mexico's oil exports went to the United States, partly because 
the United States was more likely than distant countries to prefer 
Mexican oil supplies.
Mexico follows OPEC pricing policies, but is not a member of OPEC. 
All customers pay the same price plus the transport cost. Since the 
United States is so close to Mexico, it pays a lower landing price for
O AMexican crude than most countries. To promote diversification of 
exports, Mexico invited Japan, Canada, France and other countries to 
increase trade and investment in Mexico in exchange for increased oil 
supplies.21
Mexican oil is a relatively secure supplemental supply for the 
United States. However, the official policy of the United States 
government is that decisions on production and export levels should be
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made by Mexico with no D. S. pressure for increases. President Carter 
maintained that such decisions should be made exclusively by the Mexican 
people. Carter said that the United States was interested in purchasing 
oil and gas, though it had no inclination to force Mexico to give it
onspecial privileges. The Reagan administration also follows this policy, 
believing that market forces should determine U. S. imports of Mexican 
oil and gas, and that a more aggressive strategy would only arouse
O OMexican sensitivities about the national patrimony.
An additional reason for U. S. restraint during the Carter adminis­
tration was the fear that all-out production of Mexican petroleum would 
cause spiralling inflation due to the rapid increase of revenue into the 
economy. It was thought that the best assurance of continued imports of
A  /
Mexican crude was a stable Mexican economy.
The United States has purchased oil from Mexico for the Strategic 
9 SPetroleum Reserve, but other than that the U. S. does not buy oil from
Mexico on a government-to-government basis. Politically, the Mexican
government could not afford to sell as much to the United States govern-
9 fiment as the United States now buys in private market transactions. In 
1980 the U. S. purchased about 560,000 barrels of crude from Mexico per 
day at a cost of $6 billion. ^  By 1982 Mexico had become the United 
States' largest supplier of foreign oil.^®
Natural Gas Relations
Unlike oil, U. S. natural gas purchases are negotiated on a 
government-to-government basis or else approved by the government. In 
1977 six U. S. companies had arranged to buy Mexican gas at $2.60/thousand, 
which was the price of intrastate gas in Texas. An 1,100 mile pipeline
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was to be built from the Cactus field in Tabasco to the Texas border.
However, U. S. Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger refused to sanction
the deal because the Administration was trying to pass the Natural Gas
Policy Act, a bill calling for a domestic gas ceiling of less than $2.00
per thousand cubic feet. Allowing the import of Mexican gas at $2.60 per
thousand would have added unneeded complications to the passage of the
bill. After the bill became law, Schlesinger continued to oppose the
Mexican gas deal because the price was higher than that of Canadian gas
0 Qat $2.18 per thousand cubic feet. v
This move caused major disillusionment between the Carter and 
Lopez Portillo administrations. The Mexicans felt that Schlesinger was 
trying to take advantage of them because the United States was their only 
potential customer. They pointed out that Canada had refused to increase 
gas sales to the United States since 1970. In addition, they pointed to 
Schlesinger's approval of a deal to pay $3.00 per thousand for frozen gas 
from Soviet-oriented Algeria. President Jose Lopez Portillo, therefore, 
terminated the gas pipeline at Monterrey, and Mexico used the gas for 
industry and home heating. However, Mexico was unable to use all of the
O Agas and millions of cubic feet were flared daily.
President Lopez Portillo had insisted on constructing the 1,100 
mile pipeline to Texas making clear his intention to sell Mexican gas to 
the United States. His opponents had favored the construction of a 
seventy mile pipeline to the Gulf of Mexico from which the gas would have 
been shipped to the highest bidder. The United States rejection of the 
gas deal touched a raw nerve in Mexico, making it difficult for the 
Lopez Portillo administration to offer favorable terms to the United 
States on this or any other matter.^
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Before President Carter’s February, 1979, visit to Mexico the U. S. 
Department of Energy attempted to make the Mexican public aware of the 
United States’ side of the gas purchase story. The Department issued a 
memo which gave the following reasons for refusing to meet Mexico's price:
1. The price last offered by Mexico was the BTU equivalent 
of distillate oil delivered in New York Harbor. The 
United States' position was that residual fuel oil, not 
distillate, set the upper limit on competitive prices 
for supplemental gas supplies.
2. Mexican gas, even if priced at the equivalent of residual 
oil, still would have been substantially more expensive 
than domestic or Canadian natural gas. By asking for 
higher prices than Canada, Mexico put the United States 
in an awkward bind between two neighbors.
3. Authorization of Mexican gas imports tied to a distillate 
price might have imposed several short and long-term 
penalties on U. S. energy consumers and producers. In 
the near term, the Energy Department estimated that it 
could have added about $10 billion to consumer gas costs 
in the United States through 1985.
4. The Department of Energy concluded that negotiations with 
Mexico resulting in heavily subsidized gas imports at the 
expense of the nation's residual consumers would have cost 
the United States several hundred million dollars more for 
several hundred million less cubic feet of gas, with pos­
sibly higher imports. The Department stated that this 
would have been "clearly the worst of all possible worlds."
In short, the United States believed the Mexican price demands to be
O ̂premature, and not in the interests of either country.
During his visit to Mexico, President Carter tried to ease Mexican 
resentment over the handling of the gas purchase. This was not an easy 
task. President Lopez Portillo expressed the Mexican view of the canceled 
purchase in this statement: "Among permanent, not casual, neighbors
surprise moves and sudden deceit or abuse are poisonous fruits that 
sooner or later have a reverse effect." Lopez Portillo added that for 
the first time in its history, because of a nonrenewable resource,
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Mexico suddenly found itself the center of American attention, "Attention 
that is a surprising mixture of interest, disdain, and fear much like the 
recurring vague fears you yourselves inspire in certain areas of our 
national subconscious.^
In response, President Carter told the Mexican Congress that, as 
good customers, the United States was prepared to pay a fair and just 
price for the gas and oil that Mexico wished to sell.^ In the joint 
communique issued at the end of the trip, President Carter pledged to 
develop means for expediting sales of surplus Mexican natural gas to the 
United States.
After months of negotiations an agreement on natural gas was 
reached in September, 1979. The 1979 agreement was much smaller than the 
1977 deal— 300 million cubic feet per day as opposed to the original 2.5 
billion. The price settled on was $3.65 per thousand cubic feet, to be 
adjusted quarterly. ^
Debt Crisis
Mexico had planned to use its oil revenues to finance slow, careful 
economic development. The government wanted to promote high growth rates 
to solve the unemployment problem, strengthen production of basic 
consumer goods, encourage exports, develop natural resources, promote 
growth of capital goods industries, decentralize industry from Mexico 
City to the coasts and borders, and encourage development of small and
OQmedium-sized companies.
Before the discovery of oil President Echeverria had relied 
heavily on foreign borrowing to finance imports to build Mexico's 
industrial plant. By the end of his term in 1976 the external debt stood
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at $30.2 billion. Echeverria's policies resulted in slow economic growth, 
inflation, and devaluation of the peso. Business lost confidence in the 
economy and transferred capital out of the country.
When Lopez Portillo took office he imposed austerity measures and 
increased oil and gas revenues. Inflation remained high, rising to 30 
percent for 1979 and 1980, but the peso stabilized and industrial 
expansion continued.^ From 1978 through 1982 the gross national product 
grew at an annual rate of 8 percent.
Although Mexico was originally intent on not producing oil at a 
pace to cause inflation, Lopez Portillo was anxious to move ahead with 
his development program and abandoned this policy. As Luis Echeverria's 
Finance Minister Lopez Portillo had said, "If we must choose between not 
growing and borrowing, we prefer to borrow."^® Like Echeverria, Lopez 
Portillo borrowed heavily in order to finance such projects as oil 
drilling, steel production, roads, hospitals, increased automobile 
manufacturing,^-*- agricultural production, and nuclear reactors. By 1983 
the Mexican public sector debt had reached over $50 billion out of 
Mexico's overall foreign debt of $80 billion. ^  Lopez Portillo had 
planned to pay the loans with oil revenues.
Then the oil glut of 1981 dropped the price of oil by almost 20 
percent.^ Meanwhile rising international interest rates increased the 
cost of carrying the debt. In August, 1982, Mexico announced that it was 
unable to make its payments of over $3 billion for the coming quarter.^ 
The United States, whose banks held about 60 percent of Mexico's 
$80 billion debt,^~* stepped in with nearly $3 billion in aid to cover the 
crisis. It made $1 billion in oil purchase prepayments, another $1 bil­
53
lion, in agricultural credits, and put up half of a $1.85 billion short­
term loan from the Bank for International Settlements.^ To avoid 
offending Mexican sensibilities the aid was given as quietly as possible. 
In November, 1982, the immediate crisis ended with a promise of Inter­
national Monetary Fund support given on the condition that Mexico 
implement an austerity program. ^
At the end of Lopez Portillo's term in office the United States and 
Mexico had settled their differences over oil, at least for the moment.
Oil constituted an area of foreign dominance over Mexico's future at the 
beginning of this century. Mexico was perpetually concerned that the 
United States might intervene militarily to protect the investments of 
U. S. business in Mexico. Following the successful expropriation of oil 
lands, however, oil became a symbol of Mexico's independence and strength, 
a role that it still plays today. The discovery of new oil fields in the 
midst of the energy crisis aided in establishing Mexico's economic 
independence from the United States. The growing trade in oil helps to 
put Mexico on a more equal footing with the United States. For the first 
time since the beginning of World War II, Mexico seems of vital impor­
tance to the United States.
Both countries decided on policies that would encourage the 
gradual development of oil as a means of strengthening the Mexican 
economy because both feared the inflationary impact that rapid oil 
development would have on Mexico. In contrast to the disruptions caused 
by oil fifty years ago, oil relations today run smoothly. The natural 
gas controversy, however, was another matter, reminding the United States 
to tread lightly when dealing with Mexico's patrimonio.
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As oil prices fell in the early 1980's and Mexico’s debt problems 
deepened, it became apparent that U. S. - Mexican interdependence had 
increased. In accepting billions of dollars in aid from the United 
States to repay its debt, Mexico may have added to its reliance on the 
United States. On the other hand, U. S. banks, holding nearly 60 per­
cent of the debt, were certainly tied to. Mexico. Add the fact that 
Mexico is now the United States' largest supplier of foreign oil, and 
it is obvious that the United States is more dependent on Mexico than 
it was a decade ago.
As in the past, petroleum has the potential to inflame relations 
between the United States and Mexico, but so far differences have been 
settled amicably. With the importance that Mexico's oil holds for its 
economy and for the United States' energy supply, oil has pulled the 
two nations closer together.
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IV. IMMIGRATION
The immigration of undocumented Mexican workers to the United 
States provides the most noticeable area of contact between the people 
of the United States and Mexico. The migration of Mexican laborers is 
a result of economic conditions prevailing in the United States as 
contrasted to those in Mexico. The United States has traditionally 
welcomed Mexican labor in periods of prosperity, and rejected it in 
times of recession. Mexico, on the other hand, seeks constant access 
to the U. S. labor market in order to alleviate its unemployment 
problems. The situation creates continuing tension. The two nations' 
immigration policies are in direct opposition: the United States
attempts, at times half-heartedly, to impose limits on Mexican entry 
into the U. S., while Mexico believes its citizens should be allowed 
access to U. S. jobs.
Background
Studies suggest that undocumented Mexican workers coming to the 
United States are strongly motivated by economic reasons. Over 84 
percent of Mexican aliens interviewed in each of three separate studies 
said they had gone to the United States in order to find a job or to 
increase family income.
Mexican migration to the United States goes back at least 100 
years, though it did not begin automatically with U. S. development of
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territories conquered in the Mexican War. Originally, the United States 
relied on Chinese labor to develop the West. Mexican labor began to 
arrive in the United States with the railroads built to deliver the 
resources of Mexico's subsoil during the Porfirio Diaz government. The 
workers were hired to build railroads to San Antonio, El Paso, Saint 
Louis, Santa Fe, San Francisco, Kansas City and Chicago.
By the early twentieth century, Mexican manpower was used in the 
mines of Colorado and New Mexico, in the stockyards and steel mills of 
Chicago, and on the newly-irrigated croplands of Texas and California. 
The Mexican labor helped to lower U. S. production costs by exerting a 
downward pressure on wages.
From the beginning, levels of national economic development, as 
well as the play of supply and demand, have affected the migrant labor 
market. Then, as now, Mexico looked to the United States for 
technology, capital, and employment while the United States looked to 
Mexico for cheap raw materials, services, and labor.
In coming to the United States, Mexican migrants have always 
responded more to economic conditions in Mexico than to conditions in 
the United States, such as the U. S. unemployment level or the appre­
hension level by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The immigrants are attracted to the United States by employment 
opportunities. In the late 1970's it was estimated that half of
OMexico's work force was either unemployed or underemployed. In 
addition, wages are much higher in the United States than in Mexico.
In one sample agricultural day laborers were paid $120 per week in the 
U. S. compared to $9.20 per week in Mexico.^ Most rural Mexicans can
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earn and save more in one to three months in the U. S. than they could 
in an entire year of labor in their home community. A majority of 
studies indicate that illegal aliens earn at or above the U. S. 
minimum wage, though agricultural and domestic workers along the border 
tend to earn lower wages than industrial workers in the interior.^
Historically, severe draught, floods or climactic conditions which 
affect agriculture have lead to sharp increases in the rate of migration 
to the United States. One of the most basic causes of migration to the 
United States is an excess of population relative to the amount of 
cultivable land and the number of non-agricultural jobs.^ Nearly 80 
percent of Mexican immigrants originate in impoverished rural communi-
Oties, many of which have developed traditions of migrating to the U. S.
Even if Mexico's population were brought under control, migration 
to the United States would continue as long as the wage differential 
remains as large as it is today. Though it is the lack of well-paid 
jobs in Mexico which fuels migration, the importance of unemployment and 
underemployment should not be underestimated.
Mexican immigrants coming to the United States are predominantly 
young, male, and poorly educated, with five or fewer years of schooling. 
Most are occupationally unskilled, having worked only in agricultural 
jobs before entering the United States. Many have worked only on family 
farms, and are entering the wage-labor force for the first time. About 
70 percent of the Mexican workers are single when they enter the United 
States for the first time. Even after marriage, most leave their wives 
and children at home to reduce the chance of being detected by U. S. 
authorities and to avoid the high cost of supporting a family in the
QUnited States.
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It is estimated that there are between 3,5 and 6 million illegal 
residents in the United States, but that Mexican nationals account for 
less than half of the illegal/undocumented population.I® Though there 
are large numbers of undocumented Mexicans residing in the United States, 
most Mexican workers do not remain in the U. S. Studies indicate that 
only 11 percent of Mexican illegals work in the United States for over 
one year before returning to Mexico. Thirty percent of Mexican illegals 
return home when seasonal jobs end, and another 32 percent return to 
Mexico when separation from their families becomes intolerable. Given 
the choice, 74 percent of undocumented Mexican workers would prefer living 
in Mexico and working in the U. S. to moving to the United States. ^
United States Immigration Policy
Until 1965 the United States placed no limit on the number of legal
immigrants it would accept from Mexico and the other countries of the
Western H e m i s p h e r e . - ^  However, by 1924 there were restrictions requiring
that immigrants pay an eight dollar head tax and purchase a ten dollar
visa. The head tax and visa charges were too high for many Mexicans who
simply began crossing the border without paying the required fees. This
1 3was the beginning of illegal Mexican immigration to the United States.
From the beginning of this century through the 1920’s, Mexican 
immigration increased rapidly. In 1900 the U. S. census counted roughly
300,000 persons of Mexican ancestry;-^ by 1930 over 700,000 legal Mexican 
immigrants, and perhaps over one million illegal Mexicans, had entered the 
U. S.-'--’ The increase was partly a result of rapid economic development 
in the American Southwest and partly a consequence of worsening conditions 
in Mexico during the declining years of the Diaz dictatorship and the
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Revolution. The U. S. demand for agricultural labor from 1900 to 1920 
was so great that employers went to border towns to hire immigrants or 
sent "help wanted" notices into the interior of Mexico. Western mines, 
railroads and construction projects also depended heavily on Mexican 
labor. Over 70 percent of railroad workers, for example, came from 
Mexico. -*-6
During the financial boom of the twenties, most Americans were 
indifferent to the immigration of Mexicans whether legal or illegal. 
Though there was no great effort to change immigration patterns, the 
Border Patrol was created in 1924 to police both the Canadian and Mexican 
borders. Then the Great Depression, beginning in 1929, created high 
unemployment in the United States. The government began a program to 
reduce the number of workers competing for scarce jobs by repatriating 
aliens— even those with proper documentation. Over 500,000 Mexicans 
returned home under pressure from both U. S. and Mexican officials.
Legal immigrants and U. S. - born relatives of illegal immigrants were 
repatriated along with those who had entered illegally. ^
In 1942 the Bracero (day laborer) program was instituted to 
control the flow of immigrants. Both the Mexican and U. S. governments 
had reason to regulate immigration. Increasing Mexican nationalism and 
past experience led Mexico to seek guarantees that its citizens would be 
protected from prejudice, deportations, and discrimination. Abuse of 
workers had become a political issue in Mexico. The government particu­
larly wanted to keep migrants out of Texas where anti-Mexican views and 
acts had a venemous history.
American employers welcomed the illegal workers but wanted a more 
secure labor-supply system with legal Mexican immigrants. In 1941
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farmers contended that without regularized, legal immigration from Mexico 
some crops would go unharvested. Railways and other employers also 
wanted legal access to Mexican manpower.
To secure Mexico's agreement to the Bracero program, Washington 
accepted the Mexican demand that the U. S. federal government act as the 
employer. The U. S. government therefore handled all business and 
problems, including setting':the worker's wage rate and establishing 
protective measures. Texas was not allowed workers under the program, 
but still received thousands of illegal Mexicans.
The Bracero program was originally intended as a means to fill war­
time personnel shortages in the U. S., but was extended many times and 
stayed in effect until the end of 1964. Between four and five million 
temporary workers were admitted from 1942 to the end of the program. 
Supporters of the Bracero program on both sides of the border claimed that 
it would fulfill the needs of U. S. employers for workers and, at the 
same time, decrease the pressures for illegal immigration. Instead, the 
Bracero program actually encouraged illegal movement by attracting more 
workers northward than could be legally accommodated. In 1946 99,591 
illegal aliens were apprehended in the United States; by 1952 the number 
had increased to 528,815.-^
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 included legislation 
intended to discourage illegal immigration. The willful importation, 
transportation, or harboring of illegal aliens was made a felony punish­
able by a $2,000 fine, or imprisonment, or both. However, employers were 
exempted from the penalties for harboring under what is now known as the 
Texas Proviso.
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Once the new immigration law was in effect, the United States made
a major effort to enforce it and bring illegal immigration under control.
A program called "Operation Wetback" was begun to deport undocumented
workers in which the INS used paramilitary operations to sweep through
20cities in search of aliens. Over one million aliens were deported under
Operation Wetback, but complaints about "police state" methods from critics
21in both the United States and Mexico led to its abandonment in 1955.
The Bracero program only succeeded in reducing immigration when 
combined with a massive law enforcement effort, an effort which disregarded 
the rights of many of those apprehended. In addition, the agricultural 
labor portion of the Bracero program had been increased to the point that 
it depressed wages, making the jobs involved undesirable for domestic 
workers. The price of curbing illegal immigration through the combination 
of Operation Wetback and the Bracero program was deemed too high. Despite 
the desire of the Mexican government to continue the Bracero program, it 
was disbanded after 1964.^2
The termination of the Bracero program left only the H-2 provisions 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as a vehicle for the 
admission of temporary alien workers. The H-2 program is a limited pro­
gram allowing temporary workers to enter the United States if the 
Department of Labor certifies that U. S. workers are not available.
The Labor Department must also certify that the employment of aliens will 
not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly 
employed U. S. workers.^3
Agricultural employers sought to continue the use of Mexican 
workers under the H-2 provisions, but the Department of Labor precluded
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that option. From 1967 to 1977 the admission of Mexican workers was 
terminated. Then in 1977 the INS overruled the Department of Labor to 
admit Mexican nationals into western Texas for the onion and canteloupe 
harvests.
The 1964 termination of the Bracero Agreement removed legal support
from historic population movements which were well institutionalized on
9 cboth sides of the border and encouraged by U. S. employers. To some 
extent, illegal Mexican immigration since 1964 can be seen as an informal, 
clandestine continuation of the Bracero program. The numbers of immi­
grants classified as illegal have also been increased by recent changes 
in provisions for permanent immigration to the United States.
Since the 1920's, the U. S. immigration policy had been designed to 
preserve the racial and ethnic status quo. While immigration from the 
Western Hemisphere had no ceiling, quotas were established for the
o /:Eastern Hemisphere based on national origin. The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, which was passed over President Truman's veto,
preserved the national origins system. Truman objected that, "Such a
9 7concept is utterly unworthy of our traditions and ideals...' From
1952 to 1965 every president worked toward the elimination of the
9 ftnational origins quota system.
In 1965 the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended to replace 
the national origins provisions. The new goals of U. S. immigration 
policy gave family reunification top priority. Preference was also 
given to qualified immigrants in occupations beneficial to U. S.
9 0economic and cultural interests.
For the first time, however, the Western Hemisphere was also
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subject to quotas. Eariler policymakers bad seen immigration between the 
United States and her Western Hemisphere neighbors as uncontrollable on 
the one hand and as a sign of a good neighbor on the other. In contrast, 
the framers of the 1965 Act believed that the earlier policy was incon­
sistent with the elimination of place of birth as a factor in immigration 
policy since it conveyed a preferred status to Western Hemisphere born 
immigrants. The 1965 ammendments imposed a 120,000 annual numerical 
ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere effective July 1, 1968. 
As in the Eastern Hemisphere, immidiate relatives of U. S. citizens
O Aremained numerically exempt from the ceiling. Immigration from the 
Eastern Hemisphere was subject to a 20,000 per-country limit with up to
170.000 visas distributed according to a seven-category preference system.
The 120,000 annual ceiling for the Western Hemisphere had no preference
11system or per-country limit.
Under these provisions, Mexico became the major source of Western 
Hemisphere immigrants, averaging 40,000 per year until 1976. In 1976 
the Immigration and Nationality Act was further amended to extend the
20.000 per-country limits to the Western Hemisphere as well as the
33Eastern Hemisphere. The act was intended to end ethnocentric policies 
and put both hemispheres on an essentially equal immigration system based 
on existing 170,000 and 120,000 ceilings. The Congress seriously 
considered increasing the per-country ceiling to 35,000 for contiguous 
countries within the Western Hemisphere limit of 120,000. However, it 
decided there would be a problem of illegal immigration from Mexico 
whether the ceiling was 35,000 or 20,000, and increasing the ceiling for 
Canada and Mexico would only have increased demand throughout the rest of
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the hemisphere. To avoid unequal treatment, the concept of a special 
relationship was rejected.^
Since numerically limited immigration from Mexico had been running 
around 40,000 per year prior to the time the 20,000 per-country limit took 
effect on January 1, 1977, it was unavoidable that the new law reduced 
Mexico's v i s a s . C u t t i n g  Mexico's per-country limit in half created a 
sudden bottleneck in legal immigration. The new legislation thus rein­
forced the process of illegal immigration.^ By the late 1970's the INS 
guessed that up to 800,000 Mexican illegals entered the United States
0 7each year. There was widespread dissatisfaction among U. S. citizens
with an immigration policy that seemed to be out of control.^8
In 1977 Presidents Carter and Lopez-Portillo took a step toward
solving the problem by establishing a Consultative Mechanism to study
immigration and other unresolved U. S. - Mexican issues. The Migration
Group of the Consultative Mechanism established a program of research
exchange, cooperation against smugglers of illegal immigrants, and joint
19training of U. S. and Mexican immigration officials.
The United States Congress also attempted to deal with the immigra­
tion problem. After 1977 a number of bills were submitted to enforce the 
immigration laws, but none passed. The bills commonly provided penalties 
for employers of illegal aliens and amnesty for workers already in the 
United States. Some bills also called for national identity cards. 
Hispanic, civil rights, and business groups successfully opposed the 
measures.^ When a proposal submitted by President Carter was also 
rejected, Congress responded by creating the Select Commission for 
Immigration and Refugee Policy in May, 1978. The Commission evaluated
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the policies, laws, and processes regulating immigration to the United 
States, and submitted recommendations for change to the President and 
Congress.^
Legislation pending in Congress as of 1984 would incorporate the 
Select Commission’s proposals and provide the first wholesale revision of 
U. S. immigration laws since 1952. Known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, 
the measure has passed both the House and Senate, and has been sent to a 
conference committee to reconcile differences between the versions passed 
by the two houses of Congress. Both the House and Senate versions have 
the same basic goals: curbing the flow of illegal aliens into the
United States and granting legal amnesty to millions of aliens already in 
the country. Both bills provide penalties for employers who knowingly
/ Ohire illegal aliens.
Unofficial reaction in Mexico to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill has been 
unfavorable. If passed, the bill would make it harder for illegal 
immigrants to find jobs in the United States. Resentment is widespread 
in Mexico, which depends on the U. S. to ease its unemployment and 
underemployment.
The reaction of the Mexican press has been overwhelmingly hostile.
A columnist for the Mexico City daily El Universal wrote, "The insult 
inflicted on us by the U. S. has wounded our national honor." Other 
critics in the press complain that Washington has forgotten how Mexican 
labor came to the aid of U. S. agriculture during World War II, and 
condemn U. S. refusal to ease trade restrictions while Mexico suffers its 
most severe economic crisis since the Depression. Opposition party 
leaders predict increased social tensions in the northern and central
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Mexican states if the Simpson-Mazzoli bill leads to greater numbers of 
Mexicans being deported.
Privately, some influential Mexicans are more philosophical about 
the effects that the Simpson-Mazzoli bill would have. A high-ranking 
government official commented, "I don't think all of a sudden we will 
have a large number of Mexicans returning and endangering the country.
In the Mexican family, where everyone lives in one room, one more won't 
change the situation.
Mexican Immigration Policy
During General Porfirio Diaz's government, Mexico considered 
emigration to have a positive value because returning workers brought 
back new skills and techniques. Later, toward the close of the 1920's, 
Mexicans were becoming aware of the drawbacks associated with emigration, 
but still regarded it as an "escape valve." Emigration was considered a 
solution rather than a problem.
This view changed during President Lazaro Cardenas' term in office. 
Cardenas served from 1934 to 1940, during which time the United States was 
repatriating workers to ease the domestic unemployment of the Depression. 
The Mexican people's awareness of emigration issues bacame more acute as 
the abuses, maltreatment and violence associated with the deportation of 
large contingents of workers attracted attention. Public opinion united 
to demand that the Mexican government protest to the United States. 
Meanwhile, Cardenas initiated a repatriation program to place the 
deportees in agricultural and cattle raising communal centers.
During the administration of Manuel Avila Camacho from 1940 to 1946 
the first of the Bracero agreements was signed; for the next 22 years
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they regulated emigration to the United States. The Bracero programs 
provided a partial solution to the emigration problem, but also generated 
problems by attracting many Mexicans without proper papers to the United 
States. The Mexican government was put to the expense of creating a 
department to control workers who did not stay within the established 
quotas. Mexico also had to assume responsibility for the selection, 
hiring, board and lodging, and transport of bracero workers. After the 
final Bracero agreement was signed in 1951, the issue of migrant workers 
was not discussed again by the United States and Mexico until the program 
ended.^
When the Bracero program was dropped in 1964, Mexico was essentially
content to ignore the issue. It limited diplomatic initiatives to calls
for greater protection of the rights of aliens while in the United States,
and made periodic efforts to secure a new contract labor agreement. In
1974 President Luis Echeverria rejected the idea of a new Bracero program
on the grounds that it would only lead to increased exploitation of
Mexican workers in the United States. Echeverria often complained of the
mistreatment of undocumented workers, blaming increased migration on the
widening inequalities between rich and poor nations.
When Lopez Portillo took office in 1976, the tone of Mexican policy
became more pragmatic, but the message was the same. In his annual address
on September 1, 1977, he stated:
We would hope that Mexicans could realize their maximum 
personal and social potential in our country. Nevertheless, 
several thousand Mexican workers in search of other horizons 
cross our borders without the necessary documentation. In 
part, this movement is a result of our unemployment. I 
repeat that they are not delinquents; that the possible 
violation of migration laws does not sanction the infringe­
ment of labor laws, and even less of human rights. Therefore
71
we hope that the response to the workers is not police action 
but measures based on understanding and courtesy among the 
affected parties in order to resolve this common problem, which 
is rooted in a very old relationship between us which is 
unfavorable to us. To correct it would remedy many ills. We 
have tried our best to locate the causes and moderate the 
effects of the problem. We state once more that we want to 
export not labor but products. Our being able to do so depends 
on how well we understand the problem and how balanced a solu­
tion we can find.
Lopez Portillo proposed trade concessions from the United States, 
such as lower tariffs on Mexican shoes and agricultural products, as a 
means of reducing the flow of illegal immigrants.46 He maintained that 
the only way to alleviate the dire poverty and unemployment which drove 
Mexicans to emigrate was by giving Mexico an equal chance on the world 
markets and eliminating trade barriers. He felt that the United States 
should consider the causes as well as the control of immigration. ^
Since abandoning the bracero concept, Mexico has viewed the emigra­
tion issue as a developemnt problem to be solved over the long term. The 
government is relying on broad national plans for industrialization to 
ease unemployment, and with it the problem of undocumented migrant 
workers.4®
Officially, undocumented emigration is a violation of Mexican 
statute, but the government does little to end emigration beyond expressing 
official disapproval. The Mexican government does not feel compelled to 
stop the emigration because the outflow of population is reversible and 
the workers return to Mexico. In addition, the emigration benefits 
Mexico by serving as a social and economic safety valve.49 Emigration to 
the United States helps to make up the difference between the 800,000 
workers who enter Mexico’s job market annually and the 350,000 new jobs 
created each year."^ Finally, migrant remittances of money saved and
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sent back to Mexico are probably in excess of $3 billion per year. The 
remittances are a crucial factor in the Mexican balance of payments, 
accounting for more income than tourism.
Illegal emigration is a sensitive issue for Mexico in the sense 
that the large volume of emigrants calls attention to the failure of 
Mexico's development policies to create employment and raise income for a 
large sector of the population. ^  Emigration is also a disadvantage in 
that it siphons off valuable human capital— as much as 8 percent of the 
Mexican population may be involved in the influx into the United States.
The issue has strong nationalistic overtones reinforced by isolated 
but widely publicized cases of physical mistreatment of Mexican illegals 
in the United States, and by the general awareness that the U. S. 
historically has recruited Mexican labor in times of emergency and 
officially shunned it in normal times.^ Emigration also touches the 
national pride by exposing the developmental disparities between the 
United States and Mexico, casting Mexico in the role of dependent. 
National dignity and sovereignty are at stake.
The problem of illegal immigration is a highly visible one. The 
presence of hundreds of thousands of undocumented Mexican workers in the 
U. S. labor force leads to the public perception that aliens are taking 
jobs away from U. S. citizens, depressing wages, arid putting a burden on 
social programs. Despite these charges, there is almost no concensus on 
the impact that illegal immigration actually has on U. S. society. In 
Mexico highly publicized incidences of abuse and violence lead to the 
perception that Mexican workers are routinely victimized by the United 
States.
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The approaches that the United States and Mexico take in handling 
the immigration problem are very different. The United States has tried 
to block the entry of illegals through legislation and border patrols.
This approach, if successful, would bring immediate results in the form 
of lower immigration to the United States, but fails to address the root 
of the problem. Mexico, on the other hand, chooses to ignore the effect—  
illegal emigration— and attempts to treat the cause— lack of adequate 
employment. However, even if the Mexican government achieves its employ­
ment creation targets, it will take 286 years to wipe out the existing 
backlog of unemployed and underemployed workers. Ignoring emigration is 
a feasible solution for Mexico which needs the "safety valve" provided by 
employment in the United States.
Though of long standing, the immigration problem is relatively low 
key and does not damage official relations between the United States and 
Mexico. Immigration problems, however, tend to deepen resentments among 
both U. S. and Mexican citizens. In that sense, immigration has a 
negative impact on the way the two peoples view each other.
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V. CONCLUSION
Relations between the United States and Mexico remain friendly in 
spite of persistent problems. Economic ties are basic to U. S. - Mexican 
relations; the nations are bound together by trade and immigration, 
encouraged by geography. Because immigration and trade, especially oil 
trade, are the areas of greatest contact, they are also the most constant 
sources of conflict.
Relations today are sometimes made more difficult by resentments 
carried over from the past. Two themes have run throughout U. S. - 
Mexican history: the United States has always dominated Mexico, and 
conversely, Mexico has been of secondary importance to the United States. 
Mexico is acutely aware of U. S. dominance and struggles to escape it.
Chapter I reviewed U. S. - Mexican history to demonstrate the theme 
of U. S. dominance and Mexico's resentment of U. S. influence. It also 
showed how 19th century suspicions and hostilities have given way to the 
cordial relations existing since the 1940's.
In the beginning U. S. domination of Mexico was territorial in 
nature. From the time of its independence in 1821, Mexico harbored 
suspicions about the expansionist tendencies of the American people who 
at that time were toying with the idea of pushing the U. S. boundary 
south to the Rio Grande. Such a move would have contravened the 1821 
Spanish treaty which named the Sabine as the southern border. In spite
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of doubts, Mexico decided to allow U. S. citizens to settle Texas. The 
Texans soon rebelled against Mexico, and eventually Texas was annexed by 
the United States.
Shortly after annexation, the United States provoked Mexico into a 
war over the western boundary of Texas. The war ended with the United 
States gaining the Mexican territories of Texas, California, and New 
Mexico. The Texas Revolution and the Mexican War produced long-lasting 
distrust and hostility between the United States and Mexico.
Relations improved briefly under Presidents Lincoln and Juarez as 
the United States refused to recognize the Empire that France imposed on 
Mexico. Under Juarez's successor, Porfirio Diaz, however, the two nations 
nearly went to war over border violations. Tensions subsided when Diaz 
finally ordered additional troops to guard the frontier. For the remain­
der of the Diaz era, relations, spurred by growing economic ties, 
continued to improve.
Diaz encouraged U. S. and British investment in order to build a 
modern economy for Mexico. Though official relations with the United 
States improved steadily, the Mexican people objected to foreign "coloni­
zation.” It was during the Diaz era that U. S. domination of Mexico was 
extended to economic matters.
Economics was not the only area of U. S. influence, however. The 
United States intervened in the Mexican Revolution several times, most 
notably at Veracruz. The U. S. occupation of Veracruz resulted in the 
deaths of over 300 Mexicans, and contributed to the resignation of 
General Huerta. After Huerta resigned, the United States recognized 
General Carranza's faction, ignoring the claims of Pancho Villa. Villa
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retaliated by killing 33 U. S. citizens in border raids. Once again war 
threatened, but U. S. attention turned to World War I; affairs in Mexico 
took a backseat to problems in Europe. The events of the Revolution left 
a legacy of bitterness that still arouses Mexican resentment toward the 
United States.
After the Revolution, U. S. concerns with Mexico again focused on 
economic issues. Worried by provisions in the Mexican Constitution that 
gave the state ownership of subsoil properties, the United States for 
three years refused to recognize Alvaro Obregon's government. The U. S. 
finally recognized Obregon after the question of oil property rights was 
settled to its satisfaction at the Bucareli Conference in 1923. At the 
Conference Mexico agreed not to seize oil lands if a "positive act" to 
drill oil had been taken prior to May 1, 1917.
A year later U. S. - Mexican relations were strained almost to the
breaking point when Mexico ordered the oil companies to exchange their 
property titles for leases. The controversy was settled by the Mexican 
Courts at the suggestion of U. S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow. The United 
States acknowledged the court settlement, and issued a release that future 
policies would also be determined by Mexico. The United States had 
finally recognized full Mexican sovereignty where U. S. interests were 
involved.
The question of oil surfaced again in 1938 when Mexico nationalized 
the oil companies. The governments of the United States and Mexico 
remained stalemated over the oil expropriation until the approach of
World War II hastened an agreement settling the claims. After World War II,
each country turned its attention elsewhere.
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For over a century from 1821 to 1938 U. S. - Mexican relations were 
marked by hostility and suspicion. Even the improvements in economic 
relations during the Diaz era led. to serious strains later when Mexico 
reasserted its authority over oil properties. Tensions did not finally 
relax until Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and the 1941 General 
Agreement to settle the oil expropriation dispute.
Since the 1940's U. S. - Mexican relations have been generally 
friendly. The Chamizal boundary dispute and Colorado River salinity 
controversy were settled. Cooperative programs were established to handle 
a number of problems including narcotics control, water pollution, and 
artifact smuggling.
By the early 1970's, however, the friendship was showing signs of 
strain. Misunderstandings over the U. S. vote on the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties, immigration, and natural gas pricing, as well as 
differences over Central American policy gave the appearance that relations 
had deteriorated. In an article titled, "A Mexican Perspective," Olga 
Pellicer de Brody observed that a series of irritating situations had 
ruined the "climate of cordiality" existing from 1942 to 1970. The 
article cited the Ixtoc I oil spill, the natural gas controversy, migrant 
worker disputes, oil export levels and trade liberalization as contributing 
factors. •*-
Though differences with Mexico in the past few years seem sharp, 
they are only part of the normal ups and downs experienced by the United 
States and Mexico during the postwar era. Of the problems cited by Olga 
Pellicer de Brody, the oil spill and the gas controversy have already 
been settled. It is true that trade, energy and immigration issues are
81
constant irritants. However, problems are always under discussion through 
the Consultative Mechanism, if not through state visits. Since the 1940Ts 
the United States and Mexico have settled their differences amicably.
The constant appearance of deteriorating relations arises from the 
long-term nature of the problems facing the two countries. Problems with 
trade, pollution, immigration and energy recur over time. Solutions are 
never final, yet the United States and Mexico continue to cooperate ..in 
settling differneces.
Chapters II, III, and IV illustrate the importance of economics to 
the U. S. - Mexican relationship. The topics covered— trade, oil, and 
immigration— are the most prominent issues confronting the United States 
and Mexico. Each of these issues is based on economics. Chapters II, III, 
and IV also show that Mexico depends on the United States in terms of trade 
and immigration much more than the U. S. depends on Mexico. The chapters 
bear out the conclusion that while the United States dominates Mexico, 
Mexico is of secondary importance to the U. S. Oil is the exception to 
this rule.
Trade provides the contacts through which the people of the United 
States and Mexico deal with one another. Mexico is one of the United 
States' largest trading partners, but the United States is Mexico's 
largest trade partner. Although the United States dominates Mexico's 
foreign trade, the reverse is not true. The composition of Mexico's 
imports from the United States also contributes to dependence because 
Mexico relies on the U. S. for many of the capital goods necessary to 
sustain its development. The United States, in contrast, purchases mostly 
raw materials and food from Mexico. While Mexico is the United States'
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principal supplier of foreign oil, Mexican oil represents only 5 percent 
of U. S. consumption. Nonetheless, Mexico's trade is important to the 
United States.
The stated objectives of U. S. foreign policy regarding Mexico in­
clude the development of a modern Mexican economy, a mutually beneficial 
system of trade and investment, and encouragement of U. S. private invest­
ment in the form needed to promote Mexico's growth. These objectives 
reveal the importance that the United States places on economic ties with 
Mexico.
Immigration is another area of relations which rests on economic 
influences. The immigrant movement is the result of inadequate employment 
opportunities in Mexico compared to opportunities available in the United 
States. Though U. S. employers depend on Mexico for inexpensive labor, 
Mexico's dependence on immigration as a means of alleviating widespread 
underemployment and unemployment is more obvious.
Oil is one area in which Mexico is not dependent on the United States, 
although the U. S. does purchase about 80 percent of Mexico's oil exports.
In the mid-seventies the size of Mexico's oil deposits focused U. S. 
attention on Mexico. For the first time since World War II, affairs with 
Mexico seemed vitally important to the United States. Even with regard to 
oil, however, Mexico is not entirely free of U. S. influence. When Mexico 
borrowed too heavily against its oil revenues, the United States, whose 
banks held about 60 percent of Mexican debts, stepped in with $3 billion 
in aid to cover the crisis. In the area of oil trade, the U. S. - Mexican 
relationship is more interdependent than U. S. dominated.
Mexico's oil discoveries have helped to give it a more important, 
more equal status in relation to the United States. Oil, however, is not
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enough to offset the overall imbalance in the relationship. Mexico will 
remain economically dependent on the United States.
As Chapter I showed, Mexicans resent the influence that foreign 
powers, especially the United States, have had over their nation.
Chapters II, III, and IV outline the ways in which this resentment affects 
policy today.
Reacting to the "economic invasion” of the Diaz era, Mexico passed 
laws limiting foreign investment. Foreign companies operating in Mexico 
must consider themselves as Mexican nationals and seek no special 
protection from their own governments. The petroleum and forest industries 
are entirely off-limits to foreign participation; they are solely Mexican 
owned. The mining industry, and all new investments after 1973, require 
majority Mexican participation except where the requirement is waived.
The decision not to join GATT also reflected Mexico's desire to maintain 
trading and investment independence.
Reaction to foreign control was especially strong in the petroleum 
industry which was nationalized in 1938. Nationalization was an enor­
mously popular move seen as a reassertion of Mexican sovereignty over 
foreign companies. More recently, the Mexican government's construction 
of a gas pipeline to Texas revived nationalist fears of domination by 
U. S. oil interests. Subsequent U. S. rejection of gas purchases caused 
major disillusionment with the United States. Later, when the U. S. 
arranged an aid package to help Mexico over its debt crisis, the situation 
was handled quietly to avoid offending Mexican sensitivities once again.
Immigration does not have such a volatile history. U. S. policies 
tend to be guided by whatever is the current state of the economy. In
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times of recession the reaction is to clamp down on illegal immigration; 
at other times enforcement is more relaxed. Mexico believes that by 
accepting its workers during times of emergency or prosperity and later 
rejecting them, the United States insults its national honor. This 
attitude shows in Mexico's failure to enforce its laws against illegal 
emigrat ion.
Aside from past differences, the United States and Mexico are faced 
with a steady stream of disagreements in areas that currently concern 
them. Chapters II, III, and IV examined policies and goals relating to 
the most important issues in U. S. - Mexican relations today.
In the area of trade, the United States and Mexico are in harmony 
in their desire to promote a modern Mexican economy and mutually benefi­
cial trade. Ideas of what is "mutually beneficial" do not. always coincide. 
In addition, their methods of attaining a modern economy differ. The 
United States wishes to encourage distribution of trade and investment 
through free market forces, and would like to eliminate nontariff barriers 
and export subsidies. It believes that these goals can best be achieved 
through membership in GATT. Mexico rejected GATT, and protects its 
national industries through such nontariff barriers as import licenses.
U'. S. and Mexican oil policies with regard to Mexico's oil are 
more compatible. To begin with Mexico had planned a slow, steady 
development of its oil resources to avoid excessive inflation. The 
United States endorsed this policy. When Mexico moved ahead too quickly 
with its development plans and its oil revenues failed to cover its debts, 
the United States extended aid. Mexico is attempting to diversify its 
oil sales so that it does not rely on the United States as an export
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market. Officially, the U. S. bows to this decision. The government has 
stated that decisions on production and export levels should be made by 
Mexico with no U. S. pressure for increases. The United States does not 
want to arouse Mexican antagonisms by pursuing an aggressive policy towards 
Mexican oil.
Perhaps the most obvious policy differences between the United States 
and Mexico occur in the area of immigration. Emigration without proper 
documentation is officially illegal under Mexican law. In practice, 
however, the Mexican government allows undocumented emigration. Since 
adopting the 20,000 per year ceiling on numerically limited immigration 
from Mexico, U. S. policy has been at odds with the Mexican view that 
undocumented emigrants "are not delinquents." While the U. S. attempts 
to limit immigration through ceilings on legal entry, Mexico suggests 
trade concessions and development plans to reduce the need for immigration. 
Despite marked differences in policy, Mexican officials acknowledge the 
necessity of U. S. attempts to control its borders.
U. S. - Mexican disputes over conflicting policies attract a great 
deal of attention and often cause alarm. Certain types of issues can be 
settled and forgotten quickly. Boundary problems such as pollution and 
smuggling fall into this category. In other areas such as foreign policy, 
the two countries basically agree to disagree.
It is the bedrock economic issues that cause trouble again and again. 
It is also the bedrock economic issues that bring the United States and 
Mexico together again and again. It is in each nation's interest to 
continue its trade with the other. The congruity of national interests 
is reflected in the fact that both nations are working, in their 
different ways, toward one end: a stable and prosperous Mexico.
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The United States and Mexico wish to promote trade to establish a 
healthy Mexican economy which would benefit Both nations. Separate 
interests and past- differences may upset relations temporarily, but U. S. - 
Mexican relations have a firm foundation in mutual economic interests.
The friendship will withstand many storms.
In 1967 Mexico's president, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, put it this way: 
"Geography has made us neighbors; economy has kept us the best of clients; 
and the decided will of our peoples, overcoming at times the relentless
Ocourse of history, has made us cordial and respectful friends.”
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